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JOAn B. KrOC InsTITuTE FOr PEACE & JusTICE
The mission of the Joan B. Kroc 
Institute for Peace & Justice (IPJ) 
is to foster peace, cultivate justice 
and create a safer world. Through 
education, research and peace-
making activities, the IPJ offers 
programs that advance scholarship 
and practice in conflict resolution 
and human rights. 
The IPJ, a unit of the University of 
San Diego’s Joan B. Kroc School of 
Peace Studies, draws on Catholic 
social teaching that sees peace as 
inseparable from justice and acts to 
prevent and resolve conflicts that 
threaten local, national and international peace. The IPJ was established in 2000 
through a generous gift from the late Joan B. Kroc to the University of San Diego 
to create an institute for the study and practice of peace and justice. Programming 
began in early 2001 and the building was dedicated in December 2001 with a 
conference, “Peacemaking with Justice: Policy for the 21st Century.” 
The Institute strives, in Joan B. Kroc’s words, to “not only talk about peace, 
but to make peace.” In its peacebuilding initiatives, the IPJ works with local 
partners to help strengthen their efforts to consolidate peace with justice 
in the communities in which they live. In Nepal, for example, the IPJ 
continues to work with Nepali groups to support inclusiveness and dialogue 
in the transition from armed conflict and monarchy to peace and multiparty 
democracy. In West Africa, the IPJ works with local human rights groups to 
strengthen their ability to pressure government for much needed reform and 
accountability.
The Women PeaceMakers Program documents the stories and best practices 
of international women leaders who are involved in human rights and 
peacemaking efforts in their home countries. 
WorldLink, a year-round educational program for high school students from 
San Diego and Baja California, connects youth to global affairs.
Community outreach includes speakers, films, art and opportunities for 
discussion between community members, academics and practitioners on issues 
of peace and social justice, as well as dialogue with national and international 
leaders in government, nongovernmental organizations and the military.
In addition to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, the Joan B. Kroc 
School of Peace Studies includes the Trans-Border Institute, which promotes 
border-related scholarship and an active role for the university in the cross-
border community, and a master’s program in Peace and Justice Studies to 
train future leaders in the field. 
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JOAn B. KrOC DIsTInguIshED LECTurE sErIEs
Endowed in 2003 by a generous gift to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & 
Justice from the late Joan Kroc, the Distinguished Lecture Series is a forum 
for high-level national and international leaders and policymakers to share 
their knowledge and perspectives on issues related to peace and justice. The 
goal of the series is to deepen understanding of how to prevent and resolve 
conflict and promote peace with justice.
The Distinguished Lecture Series offers the community at large an opportunity 
to engage with leaders who are working to forge new dialogues with parties 
in conflict and who seek to answer the question of how to create an enduring 
peace for tomorrow. The series, which is held at the Joan B. Kroc Institute 
for Peace & Justice at the University of San Diego’s Joan B. Kroc School of 
Peace Studies, examines new developments in the search for effective tools 
to prevent and resolve conflict while protecting human rights and ensuring 
social justice. 
DIsTInguIshED LECTurErs
April 15, 2003 Robert Edgar       
 General Secretary, National Council of Churches
 The Role of the Church in U.S. Foreign Policy   
May 8, 2003 Helen Caldicott
 President, Nuclear Policy Research Institute
 The New Nuclear Danger    
October 15, 2003 Richard J. Goldstone
 Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa
 The Role of International Law in Preventing Deadly Conflict
January 14, 2004 Ambassador Donald K. Steinberg
 U.S. Department of State
 Conflict, Gender and Human Rights: Lessons Learned   
 from the Field
April 14, 2004 General Anthony C. Zinni
 United States Marine Corps (retired)
 From the Battlefield to the Negotiating Table: 
 Preventing Deadly Conflict 
November 4, 2004 Hanan Ashrawi
 Secretary General – Palestinian Initiative for the    
 Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
 Concept, Context and Process in Peacemaking: 
 The Palestinian-Israeli Experience
November 17, 2004 Noeleen Heyzer 
 Executive Director – U.N. Development Fund for Women  
 Women, War and Peace: Mobilizing for Security  
 and Justice in the 21st Century
February 10, 2005 The Honorable Lloyd Axworthy
 President, University of Winnipeg
 The Responsibility to Protect: Prescription for a Global   
 Public Domain 
March 31, 2005 Mary Robinson 
 Former President of Ireland and U.N. High  
 Commissioner for Human Rights  
 Human Rights and Ethical Globalization
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March 25, 2009 Ambassador Jan Eliasson
 Former U.N. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for  
 Darfur and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
 Armed Conflict: The Cost to Civilians
October 8, 2009 Paul Farmer
 Co-founder of Partners In Health and
 United Nations Deputy Special Envoy to Haiti
 Development: Creating Sustainable Justice
November 18, 2009 William Ury 
 Co-founder and Senior Fellow of the Harvard 
 Negotiation Project  
 From the Boardroom to the Border: 
 Negotiating for Sustainable Agreements
February 25, 2010 Raymond Offenheiser 
 President – Oxfam America 
 Aid That Works: A 21st Century Vision 
 for U.S. Foreign Assistance
October 27, 2005 His Excellency Ketumile Masire
 Former President of the Republic of Botswana  
 Perspectives into the Conflict in the Democratic Republic   
 of the Congo and Contemporary Peacebuilding Efforts
January 27, 2006 Ambassador Christopher R. Hill
 U.S. Department of State  
 U.S. Policy in East Asia and the Pacific
March 9, 2006 William F. Schulz
 Executive Director – Amnesty International USA
 Tainted Legacy: 9/11 and the Ruin of Human Rights 
September 7, 2006 Shirin Ebadi 
 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate
 Iran Awakening: Human Rights, Women and Islam
October 18, 2006 Miria Matembe, Alma Viviana Pérez, Irene Santiago 
 Women, War and Peace: The Politics of Peacebuilding
April 12, 2007 The Honorable Gareth Evans
 President – International Crisis Group
 Preventing Mass Atrocities: Making “Never Again”a Reality
September 20, 2007 Kenneth Roth
 Executive Director – Human Rights Watch
 The Dynamics of Human Rights and the Environment
March 4, 2008 Jan Egeland
 Former Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
 Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator for the U.N.  
 War, Peace and Climate Change: A Billion Lives in the Balance
April 17, 2008 Jane Goodall
 Founder – Jane Goodall Institute and U.N. Messenger of Peace
 Reason for Hope 
September 24, 2008 The Honorable Louise Arbour
 Former U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
 Integrating Security, Development and Human Rights 
10 11
BIOgrAPhY OF rAYmOnD OFFEnhEIsEr
Raymond Offenheiser has been president of Oxfam America for 13 years. 
During his tenure, he has overseen the growth of Oxfam America from a 
small nonprofit agency into a recognized world leader in the global social 
justice movement. Under his direction, Oxfam America has increased its 
annual budget fivefold to $75 million, substantially increased its donor base 
and created a diverse and highly professional staff.
Offenheiser recently joined a high-level group of think tank members to 
promote the modernization of foreign assistance. The intent is to replace 
the Kennedy and Cold War era vision for American aid with a new strategy, 
mandate, legislation and structure to guide America’s international aid efforts 
into the 21st century.  
He has also positioned Oxfam America as a leading actor in the field of 
corporate social responsibility by initiating the Private Sector division within 
the organization. Under his leadership, Oxfam America has initiated a variety 
of innovative partnerships with Fortune 500 corporations.
Before joining Oxfam America, Offenheiser served for five years as the Ford 
Foundation representative in Bangladesh and, prior to that, in the Andean 
and Southern Cone regions of South America. He has also directed programs 
for the Inter-American Foundation in both Brazil and Colombia and worked 
for Save the Children Federation in Mexico.
With over 30 years of work in the field of international agricultural 
development, Offenheiser is active as member and advisor to numerous 
organizations on issues of food security, climate change, trade reform and 
sustainable development, including the World Agricultural Forum, Biovision, 
World Fish Center and the Green Group of leading environmental CEOs. He 
is currently the honorary president of Wetlands International, the leading 
nonprofit global network focused on the protection of wetlands throughout 
the world.  
Offenheiser is a frequent commentator in the media on such issues as foreign 
aid, international debt, human rights, humanitarian crises and global trade 
policies. He has appeared in programs on all major U.S. news networks as 
well as BBC and CNN International and has been a quoted source in the 
New York Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe and numerous other major 
American newspapers.
Offenheiser is currently a member of the board of Oxfam International and of 
BRAC USA and for 10 years served on the board and executive committee of 
InterAction. He has served and is serving on numerous advisory councils for 
such groups as the Clinton Global Initiative, World Economic Forum, Aspen 
Institute, Asia Society, Global Philanthropy Forum, Council for Economic 
Development, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Business School, 
Stanford University’s Center for Global Business and Kellogg Institute for 
International Studies at Notre Dame. He is also a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations.  
Educated at Notre Dame and Cornell, Offenheiser lives in Carlisle, Mass., 
with his wife Suzanne, son Patrick and daughter Deirdre. He is a passionate 
Latin Americanist and speaks Spanish and Portuguese fluently.  
Photo courtesy of Oxfam America
12 13
smart power and soft power and the use of other kinds of tools, everything 
from development expenditures to an increased emphasis on diplomacy. The 
reality, however, is that these capacities have been seriously compromised 
over the past several decades in terms of personnel and budgets. And given 
the enormity of the challenges that we’re facing currently, they’re not up to 
the task. So what we’re seeing on the ground is the Department of Defense 
taking on more and more of a role in the development sphere and the State 
Department running to keep up with the Department of Defense in terms of 
its role in the diplomatic sphere.
The Obama administration hopes to correct this, and a number of things have 
already happened. The State Department put through an authorization budget 
for last year, which increased the number of positions in the State Department 
significantly – I think 1,000 new positions over a two- to three-year period. 
There are similar kinds of requests for positions within USAID [United States 
Agency for International Development], to almost double USAID in size over 
the next several years, phasing it in gradually. There’s a real recognition of 
this personnel deficit, but there’s also recognition that it’s going to take a 
while to get these new cadres of personnel up and running.
In terms of the question of autonomy, the worry is that the State and 
Defense spheres will remain independent and perhaps continue to have their 
differences over boundary issues – between what is the prerogative of the 
State and what is the prerogative of Defense. I think what we’re concerned 
about is that the development sphere may be subordinated to both of them 
– and that it will not be elevated to a level where it will be the third D, but 
rather we will have two big Ds and one little D.
The process that took place under the Bush administration of subordinating 
the aid function to the State Department, called the “F Process,” basically 
transferred the role of the aid administrator into the State Department and 
transitioned their budget control and their policy planning capacity into 
the State Department, and, in effect, eradicated what had been a historic 
boundary. So in some ways that autonomy has already been compromised, 
and one of the sensitive debates in Washington is about whether that was a 
InTErVIEW
The following is an edited transcript of an interview with Raymond Offenheiser, 
conducted on Feb. 25, 2010, by Elena McCollim, program officer at the Joan B. 
Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, and Topher McDougal, instructor in the Joan 
B. Kroc School of Peace Studies at the University of San Diego.
TM: The Obama administration has advanced a vision of foreign policy – 
already adopted elsewhere – founded upon the three equal “stool legs” of 
development, diplomacy and defense. If the three of these legs are to be crafted 
into a coherent foreign policy, how much autonomy does the U.S. development 
wing have to give up? How will this challenge or inform your work reforming 
the development program?
RO: The entire discussion going on in Washington right now about the 
“3-Ds” is about how to rebalance them, how to establish some degree of 
relative strength to each of these Ds so that as the United States engages the 
world and uses these different tools – through its defense and security wing, 
through its diplomatic wing and through its development wing – they’re 
each represented well, they each have a strategic focus and they’re each 
adequately resourced and adequately structured. 
I think where people are differing now in these discussions is on what 
exactly the emphasis should be and how this should all be orchestrated. At 
the end of the day, what is the adequate level of resourcing? What should 
the strategic focus be?
In some sense what took place under the Bush administration has prompted 
some of this. A lot of our civilian capacity, both in the diplomatic and 
development fields, had been subordinated to some degree to the military 
initiatives that we were engaged in both in Iraq and Afghanistan. And in 
some ways, our framework for engaging the rest of the world has been 
driven by more of a military, defense-led approach. 
In the lead-up to the elections there had been a whole discussion about 
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good idea, whether it should be sustained in that fashion or whether there 
should be a return to something along the lines of the model that existed 
earlier, where you had a direct report of the aid director to the secretary of 
state. 
You also had independent budget authority and an independent policy 
planning unit within USAID. Right now USAID basically cannot do its own 
policy planning – it doesn’t have strategic planning capability. It’s now 
housed in the State Department and doesn’t have any independent budget 
authority, and many of the former aid directors have gone on record, both 
Republican and Democrat, and indicated this is a real problem that needs to 
be fixed. It really compromises the autonomy and the integrity of the whole 
development field as a tool of U.S. engagement in the world.
TM: Whether you are for it or against it, there is a growing phenomenon of 
civil-military cooperation that is becoming a fact of life for those working in the 
development field. In an ideal world where power dynamics between the three 
Ds – the three legs of the stool – are righted or brought into balance, how would 
you see the role of civil-military participation?
RO: For those of us who’ve been looking at this over the last two-and-a-half 
years or so, the gold standard for how this can work in an ideal world would 
be the way it works in Great Britain, where you’ve basically got a Ministry 
of Defense, a Foreign Ministry and a Ministry of Development. They have 
developed what they refer to as a whole-of-government approach, in which 
these three ministers meet as colleagues and discuss various strategic priorities 
and challenges around the world, and they’ll determine what the mix of these 
different approaches and tools should be in the way they engage their work 
and particular competencies. That’s one thing I think is missing in our system 
presently: a whole government approach that elevates development so it can 
actually be on equal footing in a conversation like that. 
An analogy that one of my colleagues uses to describe this is the Humvee 
worldview: You’re going to a village in Afghanistan and you’ve got a military 
guy driving the Humvee, someone from the diplomatic mission riding shotgun 
and someone from USAID in the back seat. They get to the village and 
the military guy has a responsibility for the PRT [Provincial Reconstruction 
Team], historically relating to the village; the diplomatic representative has a 
perspective on how this is contributing to the stabilization of the country and 
how this might enable them to achieve their long-term political goals; and the 
guy in the back meeting with the village headman gets the sense they need a 
restored irrigation system in order to improve their agriculture. 
When they get back in the Humvee and head back to Kabul, there’s a chain 
of command for the military guy to report up right away in the embassy 
or the compound, and the diplomatic guy goes to the ambassador. But the 
USAID guy is reporting to the ambassador as well, underneath the diplomatic 
representative. In other words, even though the aid priority may be of equal 
importance to the others and there might be a discussion about what should 
be emphasized in that village, the aid representatives are at a disadvantage 
in that conversation. 
TM: Getting on to Oxfam’s role in this changing landscape, Oxfam sees greater 
autonomy of country offices as necessary to decouple USAID field office 
initiatives from Washington interests. This supposedly brings development 
closer to the beneficiaries. How do you see U.S. aid efforts effectively bridging 
the gap between accountability to U.S. taxpayers and responsiveness to real 
local needs?
RO: There’s probably a continuum here where, to some degree, there are 
going to be what the Defense Department calls kinetic contexts: Where there’s 
active conflict in the mix of the integrity of the state, levels of corruption and 
capacity to absorb the aid, the ability of in-country institutions to actually 
implement aid is going to be compromised in some ways. The way that 
the development approach would have to be framed in that context would 
probably have to be a little more conservative than some other places where 
you have more developed institutions and you don’t necessarily have a 
conflict situation. If you were to compare Afghanistan at one end and Ghana 
at the other end, you can approach these things quite differently.
16 17
What we’ve tried to do is use this ownership concept to unpack the way 
this works, or could work, with the focus being on three dimensions: one is 
information, the second is capacity and the third is control. In the information 
area, one of the things we’ve discovered is that U.S. aid, as compared to other 
countries’ foreign assistance, is heavily discounted by recipient countries 
because it’s short-term – a one-year commitment. So if you’re looking at U.S. 
government money relative to Great Britain’s Department for International 
Development – money that might be a multi-year block grant – countries are 
thinking it’s less useful to them than money from Great Britain. 
We’re arguing that for development aid to be effective, governments need 
the ability to plan more effectively beyond a one-year frame. And the 
planning commitments need to be made within a much more structured and 
strategic planning framework that embraces a variety of different sectors. The 
Millennium Challenge Corporation1 is, to our minds, an innovation within the 
U.S. field of foreign assistance that has perhaps been underappreciated as a 
basis for reform. It tries to engage governments in a collaborative planning 
process, recognize and allow governments to set their own priorities, push 
back on those where it makes sense and perhaps the U.S. may have some 
interests of its own, and ultimately produce a joint agreement for what would 
be funded on a multi-year basis against specific outcome indicators. In some 
sense multi-year funding is a clear transparent deal and a variety of sectors can 
be supported simultaneously because there’s real ownership on the national 
level of what the plan is about and what the funding will actually yield.
Then of course there are performance benchmarks along the way that the 
government has to meet in order for further tranches and disbursements to be 
released. In many ways, this is where the international community has been 
going. Unfortunately in the context of Washington, which likes to see rapid-
fire disbursals of funding, the Millennium Challenge Corporation has been 
challenged itself because it has tried to be careful about the management of 
taxpayers’ money and the way it’s been crafting this whole new approach to 
how it deals with the countries. 
In some ways the full value of this approach as the basis for strategic 
partnerships going forward hasn’t been fully assimilated by Congress and the 
broader development community in Washington. But from our point of view, 
it marks a way of moving away from some of the traditional approaches that 
we’ve seen in aid that might have been more sectorally-driven or driven by 
embedding staff in particular ministries.
EM: It is very interesting to hear your description of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC) because it is indeed an innovation that seems to have 
introduced rationality in exactly the way that aid reformers proposed. How 
widespread was the sense, at least at the MCC’s inception, among the NGO 
[nongovernmental organization] community that it was more of a political tool? 
Was that relevant then and, if so, is it still relevant now?
RO: I think when it was first created the broad development community, 
NGOs and contractors alike, were suspicious of it. If you are a subcontractor 
of USAID, it represented a potential threat because you are actually dealing 
directly with governments, and you are going to be delivering large tranches 
of money to governments and not necessarily relying on a contractor or 
NGO community. It was also seen as a bit of a maverick institution in the 
sense that it worked around the USAID structure and at least initially didn’t 
even incorporate the USAID director into its governance structure. So it was 
seen as a signal that there was some degree of dissatisfaction with the way 
that aid was functioning at the time because, in effect, it was a whole new 
institutional approach. 
I think that over time some of us in the development community have come 
to appreciate that it does represent a real break from the past. A number of 
us were involved in reform efforts with the previous administration around 
foreign aid, and many of the things that we argued for are embodied in the 
way the MCC operates: large grants, a foundation approach, a more trusting 
basis of partnership, dealing with governments on more collaborative terms, 
giving them the space to frame how they see their context and their challenges 
                                                              
1  An independent U.S. foreign aid agency created by Congress in 2004 to combat global poverty.
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and opportunities. All of that has been part of the discussion about reform 
for some time. 
Having said that, it was also seen as a Republican innovation, so when 
Congress flipped two years before the Obama election, there was quite a bit 
of effort made to do it in. Those of us in Oxfam particularly thought it was a 
mistake, and we came out and lobbied for retaining the MCC. We thought it 
was a development innovation and that we should take a closer look at what 
it represented in terms of approach and figure out a way that it could be 
incorporated in the overall reform effort that we were embarking on.
EM: As I recall, the criteria are governance, human development and economic 
freedom. I also recall a fair amount of ideologically-tinged suspicion of the 
economic freedom criterion and the effect on economic policy in a way that 
might be deleterious to the majority. Was there equal weight given to the 
governance and human development criteria?
RO: Certainly we staunchly subscribe to the democratic governance criterion, 
and it was interesting to see a process that actually tried to come up with 
some metrics on that. I think the concern that we had about the economic 
freedom criterion was to what extent it was simply leveraging an unqualified 
adoption of a free-market economic model. We’ve tried to look at these on 
a case-by-case basis, whether that was part of the deal or not, in some sense 
doing a trade agreement through the back door. In that sense, we haven’t 
found the basis for being exceptionally critical.  
EM: Oxfam is a famous proponent of local ownership of development projects 
and seeks to strengthen civil society organizations in developing countries as a 
way to strengthen the capacity of people to hold their governments accountable 
on various levels. In countries with weak states and impoverished populations, 
civil society organizations – both local and national NGOs – are heavily reliant 
on outside funds for their survival. How would you describe the health of civil 
society organizations across the global south in terms of the material support 
they receive from across their society, from the philanthropic sector and from 
the government? In countries lacking a well-developed philanthropic sector, 
what can be done to make them less dependent on outside funding and more 
rooted in their own society?
RO: If we go back through 30 years and look at what the state of civil 
society was and the kinds of roles that civil society was playing, I think we 
would find in many cases it was not as politically engaged, not as dense, 
not as linked into global social movements and global sectoral issue fora 
that exist today. I think the ‘90s was a very interesting decade because many 
of the U.N. summits that took place were open for the first time to civil 
society representatives from many countries and allowed for a lot of global 
networking. There was the environmental summit, the rights summit, the 
Cairo population summit, the women’s summit, the education summit, the 
global poverty summit. 
That created a whole explosion not only in the engagement of civil society in 
these multilateral fora, but also in the consciousness within the civil society 
movements of what was being experimented in other places, what were some 
of the normative frameworks for how civil society was being engaged or not 
engaged in their particular countries, and the recognition that the multilateral 
system could be used to create platforms for advocacy at the national level. 
Also, the emergence of the Internet created possibilities for linking people up 
in unique and different ways that were really historically unprecedented. 
I think we have a denser, more sophisticated, better linked global civil society 
than we’ve ever seen before. At the same time, I think we’ve seen a reaction 
on the part of governments to this phenomenon; in many places you’re 
seeing efforts to put forward NGO legislation that tightens up the space. 
You’re seeing challenges to the fact that NGOs are getting significant chunks 
of bilateral or multilateral funding, some of which is devoted to advocacy and 
some to basic services. 
We’ve also seen the emergence of this whole movement around issues of 
transparency and corruption, with Transparency International as a major force 
20 21
in many places in the world. There’s also the less visible International Budget 
Partnership, with 200 groups around the world doing budget monitoring of 
national governments and tracking where the money goes. So I think we’ve 
begun a process of developing accountability tools and an awareness of how 
to deal with accountability more practically that didn’t exist before. 
The financing question that you raised is a really important one because 
some governments are beginning to think about whether they need to tighten 
up the regulations in their particular countries regarding how international 
funding is channeled into public policy advocacy in their respective national 
contexts. That will make it more difficult for international funders to support 
grassroots mobilization, public interest campaigning and advocacy. I think it 
is a trend we need to watch rather carefully and perhaps challenge if we see 
it emerging. 
On the philanthropy question, I think there is some good news and some 
mixed results. We are seeing for the first time the emergence of significant 
levels of philanthropy in countries where they had the potential for it but 
now it is becoming professionalized, secularized and mainstream. India is 
probably the most notable example. We’ve set up an Oxfam India that is 
basically engaged in state-of-the-art fundraising and philanthropic activities 
in India and is one of our most successful Oxfams in terms of the returns 
on investment they’re getting from that philanthropic activity. Our hope is 
that, in time, they’ll be able to grow and become independent of some of the 
funding that some of our Oxfam employees are providing to them. Similarly, 
we’ve created an Oxfam Mexico that’s doing comparable experimentation in 
fundraising techniques there. 
I think there are some other interesting challenges that have to do with 
shifts in the way international donor money is being allocated on a global 
level. It has particular implications for regions like Latin America, where 
we’re seeing a major shift away from Latin America and toward Africa and 
to some degree South Asia, particularly with European funders. We’re seeing 
a significant impact on what had been the emergence of a very vibrant civil 
society community in Latin America that is suddenly going to be challenged 
by the disappearance of some large tranches of money from Europe over 
literally three or four decades. 
EM: Shifting now to some conflict-related questions, in reading about the 
experience of Salvadoran women in refugee camps I was struck by the way they 
emerged with new skills and resourcefulness after years spent in the camps. I’ve 
read something similar about Sudanese displaced persons, particularly women. 
How prevalent do you think this experience is? And how can NGOs, like Oxfam, 
working in conflict humanitarian emergencies promote this transformation 
among refugees and displaced persons, and especially women, given what we 
know about women as agents of change?
RO: In many of these emergency situations we have been trying to move 
beyond the traditional operational response of delivering services in a camp 
setting to being more focused on capacity building and institution building 
within the context we are working. So, for example, in the Sudanese case 
we’re working with Sudanese NGOs that are doing what are considered 
peacebuilding activities in and around camps in north Darfur. In a number 
of cases we’re working with women’s groups through those partner outreach 
initiatives. 
The tricky part there is recognizing you’ve still got a large responsibility for 
delivering on the basic service needs of that population. But looking into the 
future, you want to assume that these are the people who are going to be 
going back to communities and rebuilding their lives, and you want them 
to be prepared for that kind of transition. You want there to be leadership 
within their various groups to be able to carry that forward. So in some ways 
you want to be anticipating that. 
Working through partner relationships and identifying gender as a particular 
area of focus is something that we’ve felt is very important. Several years ago 
we did some research on post-conflict scenarios in various countries and were 
looking at what some of the indicators were that conflict had really subsided 
and a genuine post-conflict phase was present. Oftentimes there are these 
simple indicators, like we’ve had elections and once we’ve had elections and 
22 23
have a new government set up, we assume we can all just move on. But we 
found that the most sensitive indicator of the fact that a conflict had moved 
on to new circumstances was the level of violence against women. 
As we unpacked it, we found that you had all of these disarmed combatants 
who had to be reintegrated into their communities and in some cases, these 
were combatants who had been in conflict for five, 10, 15 years. They knew 
little else. They had few skills and in many cases they didn’t necessarily 
immediately disarm. So you end up in this situation where you have a peace 
agreement, a period of calm, an election, a new government coming in and 
an assumption that everyone is laying down their arms and entering a new 
phase. But if you looked at statistics of violence against women and rape 
and various crimes of that sort, you found that it took a while for that to 
subside. So we began to look at that as almost a surrogate for post-conflict 
transitions. 
TM: How does your approach to civil society development differ when you are 
in a post-conflict stage versus a post-natural disaster situation? These are often 
lumped together in the parlance of NGOs – “We do natural disasters and post-
conflict work.”
RO: We’ve identified this whole area of “rights in crisis” as a substantive, 
priority area of focus for our policy and advocacy work in both the 
humanitarian sphere and the conflict arena. It was prompted by the work 
we did around the U.N. resolution on the responsibility to protect.2 I think it 
is fair to say that we played a pretty important role in promoting that at the 
United Nations and lobbying many of the national delegations, including the 
United States, to get that voted through and approved. 
What we’ve tried to do from a rights framework is look at what it actually 
means to try to move that forward. It’s been very tricky terrain because the 
United Nations has been a little uncertain about how to implement it. 
We’ve shifted to this rights and crises frame and logic for ourselves as a 
way of thinking about how we engage in these conflict and post-conflict 
situations – and whether and to what degree we’re shifting our programs 
from protection of families and communities in camps to something that 
might involve shifting people back into normal lives. 
Let me give you one specific example. One of the interesting cases now 
is Uganda and the movement of people back into the areas of northern 
Uganda. How do we shift from working with people in camps, where we’ve 
been present for a very long time, to actually helping people go back to what 
were their villages, which now in some cases are occupied? How do we help 
enable that process to occur without precipitating more conflict? Uganda is 
a case we’ve had to think about in very practical terms as the process has 
moved forward. It’s moving forward rather haltingly but, nevertheless, we 
have to think about it in those terms.
TM: You mentioned R2P [Responsibility to Protect], which brings up the issue 
of rights and whose responsibility it is to fulfill rights – who is the duty holder? 
This is an issue that is becoming increasingly problematized, where the state 
(and sometimes the international community) no longer views itself as the duty 
holder or in some cases outright abdicates the responsibility. What are your 
considerations when you have a programmatic intervention in a country to ensure 
that the services you are providing directly to citizens, who are claiming rights 
not being fulfilled by the state, do not incapacitate or too greatly circumvent the 
role of state government in providing those same services?
RO:  We’re starting from the premise that citizens are entitled to basic services 
and basic protections as a threshold concept of human security, and that 
the state is the principal duty bearer – if we’re going to acknowledge the 
sovereignty of the state. I think sovereignty is still a concept that, despite the 
debate about the responsibility to protect, is still subscribed to by most of 
the nations of the world, for fear that compromising it through these kinds of 
                                                              
2  The responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity is part of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1674. The concept is discussed at length in 
the Distinguished Lectures by Lloyd Axworthy (2005), Gareth Evans (2007) and Louise Arbour (2008). For 
booklets of their lectures, please see www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/ipj/programs/distinguished_lec-
ture_series/.
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measures at the international level could lead to other kinds of consequences 
down the road. 
In our particular case, we see ourselves as appealing to the international system 
when we think states are either ignoring or not fulfilling those responsibilities 
to basic protection or, in the worst of cases, acting as predators vis-à-vis their 
own population. I think the tricky part for us as an NGO active in that kind 
of a context is how we interpret our humanitarian imperative. For us, that’s 
the critical piece. We have a humanitarian imperative; it’s critical to our DNA 
as an organization. We think that the international community has indicated 
through a variety of international treaties and statements of international 
law that citizens are entitled to certain basic rights and that our role in those 
contexts, apart from delivering services, is to be a voice for the rights of those 
who may not otherwise have any means of redress. 
The tricky part of that calculus is in what circumstance we determine that 
we can’t meet our humanitarian role in a practical or operational way on 
the ground because the circumstances don’t permit it. Do we then opt for a 
more public challenge to the responsibility that should be exercised by the 
duty bearer, whoever that may be? I think that is always the balancing act of 
a humanitarian organization: Do we stay and assist and allow others to make 
those claims, or do we pull out and exercise those claims more aggressively 
using all the tools that may be available to us? That is probably one of our 
biggest ethical dilemmas as a humanitarian organization, and I think that’s 
true of all the organizations in our community. 
EM: There is a shift that some have characterized as the whole NGO landscape 
tilting not just toward partnerships with businesses, which many NGOs see as 
a more sophisticated type of philanthropy, but toward market-based solutions, 
market mechanisms and, for better or for worse, market dynamics. To what 
extent do you agree with this, and in what ways is Oxfam’s private sector 
initiative tapping into this shift and making use of it to advance its smart 
development missions?
RO: Over the last decade, Oxfam has given a lot of thought to whether 
we have been seeing the development challenges of the 21st century in an 
accurate and comprehensive way. One of the things we’ve realized is that 
the private sector is playing an increasingly important role in setting some of 
the opportunity horizons for poorer countries and poorer communities, and 
perhaps we have underappreciated the importance of what goes on through 
private sector investment as part of the way we go about doing our work. 
With that in mind, we have invested considerable effort in trying to think 
through what the metaphor of globalization suggests about how we should 
be doing our work in the 21st century world. The idea, for us, is that 
globalization is about the accelerated movement of people, ideas, images, 
technology and finance around the world in an accelerated chase for profit, 
and we’re trying to understand what that could mean translated into use 
for humanitarian development purposes. Is the process of globalization 
inherently harmful to the poor, or are there aspects of it that could actually 
be beneficial to the poor?
We came out with something of a mixed review of that. In the most succinct 
form, particularly looking at global trade, we articulated the view that 
international trade is not inherently bad for the poor, but the rules of the 
international trade system are rigged against the poor. And perhaps, as we 
approach globalization, we need to look at how countries can get fairer deals 
and better terms of trade and how the rules of the international trade system 
can be balanced in ways that are going to be pro-development mainly for 
poorer countries. 
The work we did on international trade led us into a more direct relationship 
with private sector firms. It led us into a variety of corporate social 
responsibility fora and into a variety of conversations with companies about 
normative standards and business practices. It also opened up a whole new 
arena of work for us of trying to look more concretely at specific businesses 
that had very direct impact on the lives and opportunities for poor nations 
– in sectors such as agricultural exports, extractive industries, the coffee 
industry, pharmaceuticals and the availability of drugs, just to name a few. 
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I ended up being fortunate enough to attend the University of Notre Dame, 
which had a very strong environment of values-based education. And in the 
midst of the Vietnam War, it launched the first peace and justice program 
in the United States under the leadership of Father [Theodore] Hesburgh,3 
who was becoming a major figure in the Catholic Church in terms of 
opposition to the Vietnam War and was also formerly the head of the U.S. 
Civil Rights Commission. It was an environment in which both civil rights 
and anti-war activism were alive and tolerated, but where the energy around 
it was channeled in very interesting and constructive ways into very positive 
conversations. I heard these conversations and I participated in a process that 
was, you might say, politicized but managed in an intelligent and constructive 
way for the students who were part of it.
In terms of other formative experiences, I later attended Cornell University 
where my first day of class was Sept. 11, 1973, which was the day of the 
Chilean coup and the overthrow of the [Salvador] Allende government. It 
happened through pure serendipity that I was in a class with 10 Chileans 
and two other North Americans. It was a course on Latin American economic 
history and the professor was a former advisor to the president of Chile, 
Eduardo Frei [Montalva], and the entire class was deeply affected by the events 
in Chile at that particular time. The entire course turned into a discussion 
of the meaning of democracy for Latin America with the fall of the Chilean 
government. That led me to be involved in a variety of human rights activities 
at Cornell related to Latin America, and assisting refugees from Chile to enter 
the United States and become resettled here. It broadened my exposure to 
the broader human rights movement. 
I later worked for the Inter-American Foundation which, at the time I was 
there, was a very experimental organization in Washington, D.C., focused on 
grassroots empowerment. Many of the programs we supported were linked 
with organizations in Latin America that were connected with the liberation 
theology movement. I was exposed in depth to the major actors, the Brazilian 
bishops, the major theologians in that field, as well as the base community 
work and organizing to promote literacy, basic health and other projects 
It has also led us to see the private sector increasingly as a non-state actor 
of significance that in many ways is outside the framework that we were 
traditionally using to look at development issues, which was usually focused 
on the role of multilateral and bilateral funding organizations and the 
impact of their aid dollars in developing countries. Recognizing that foreign 
direct investment today was dominated by private investment rather than 
development assistance, we needed to be shifting our focus away from a 
narrow focus on foreign aid and expanding it to appropriate a view toward 
the impact of private foreign investment. 
In summation, it is probably fair to say that, for us, looking at the private 
sector and the role of corporations and the role of value chains and supply 
chains is going to be a much more central part of the work we do in the 
future. Figuring out ways that we can harness and shape business models and 
supply chains to operate in ways that might be more favorable to developing 
countries is something we are giving thought to. Shaping corporate practice 
with a “Do No Harm” principle in mind is at the core of the ethic we are 
trying to bring to this. And we’re finding that we’ve had to develop a whole 
new set of competencies and staffing capabilities to enable us to do this 
well. 
TM: Switching from the organizational to the personal, how did you become 
involved in this work? 
RO: I suppose that I found my way into this field through a bit of historical 
circumstance, a bit of luck and a bit of exposure to some good mentors along 
the way. I grew up in the southern United States in the time of segregation 
and the emergence of the civil rights movement. I was exposed to some of 
the impacts of segregation on minority communities in the South. I attended 
the first integrated high school in North Carolina during that time, so I felt 
very directly what that might mean in a place like North Carolina where 
the civil rights movement was brewing and emerging. The sit-in was in 
Greensboro, N.C., you might remember. So that was very real and immediate 
and surrounding in terms of my personal experience. 
                                                              
3  Hesburgh serves on the IPJ’s International Council.
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RO: I think what energizes me the most is an abiding belief in social change – 
that social change is possible. I’ve lived long enough and in enough different 
contexts to see significant social change and be able to believe that though 
it may not happen in five minutes, it may happen in five years. It involves 
an investment of time, a building of institutions, capacity and confidence in 
people, and a recognition that there are larger structures and larger systems 
that have to be changed as part of the process. 
          
“I think what energizes me the most is an abiding belief in social 
change – that social change is possible.”
          
If there is one theme in my evolution or awakening consciousness, it’s that 
I originally ascribed to the view that a lot of this work could be done at a 
grassroots level – that it was all about grassroots empowerment. When I 
worked at the Inter-American Foundation our mantra was, “They know how.” 
I realized over time that they may know how, but the folks who have the 
money and the power may not be listening. Much of what we worked on 
would not work on a grassroots scale or be given legitimacy unless there was 
pressure on systems and policy, and unless new ideas were introduced and 
enough smart people and clever tactics and strategies could get those good 
ideas into the right places to spark that change. 
So I became something of a believer that grassroots empowerment was 
important but may not be enough – that it needed to be supplemented by 
other kinds of support and intermediation and other tools that groups like 
Oxfam or Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch could provide to 
help those processes to come to more meaningful fruition.
 
connected to the liberation theology movement in Latin America. 
Later I ended up at the Ford Foundation – which for many years has been 
the premiere U.S. foundation funding the human rights movement both in the 
United States and internationally – and was in two of their international offices, 
in Lima, Peru, and in Bangladesh, where we were funding the emergence 
of human rights organizations. Most notably, in Chile we were funding the 
organizations that were keeping discussions about democracy alive and were 
also part of promoting the national discussion about the return to democracy. 
I participated in an indirect way in that experience, as well as previously with 
grassroots organizations in Brazil and the democratic transition with the end 
of the [Ernesto] Geisel regime, the return to democracy and the Tancredo 
Neves and José Sarney governments coming into power.  
This work is extraordinarily gratifying because of the people you meet, the 
experiences you have and the quality of the organizations you are able to 
support, directly or indirectly. A major moment I was a part of, for example, 
was the funding of the launch of the Rubber Tappers Association of Brazil, 
with Chico Mendes. I was one of the only non-Brazilians to attend the launch 
meeting of that organization. I funded that meeting, which was then involved 
in setting up the extractive reserve movement in the Brazilian Amazon. 
I was also the chair of the Grameen Bank donor consortium during the 
hyper-growth phase of the Grameen Bank, so I had a very close association 
with that before Muhammad Yunus won the Nobel Peace Prize. There are 
many other similar stories I could tell about all the amazing people I’ve had 
an opportunity to work with. 
EM: I’m struck by how your own trajectory, your dawning political consciousness 
throughout your developmental years, was rooted in experiencing or observing 






Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice
Good evening, and welcome to the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice. 
The Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series is dedicated to exploring 
new knowledge about how to prevent violent conflict. In past years we’ve 
explored themes such as the role of human rights, international law or the 
environment in conflict prevention. This year we’re taking a closer look at 
development and conflict prevention. 
Conventional thinking might suggest that development should be discussed 
by economists or political scientists or international organizations, and yes, 
all of that is true. Economic development is everyone’s business. But here 
tonight we want to look particularly at development as it pertains to peace 
– as a tool for building stable societies where inequities don’t encourage 
violence and where the power of the purse doesn’t leave children starving.
With each Distinguished Lecture, we are reminded that there is no single 
solution, no development template that can be forced into every country or 
community. We need multiple solutions that are created in solidarity with 
those communities to meet their very specific needs and deal with their 
structural deficiencies at all levels. We hope that tonight’s presentation will 
contribute to the development toolbox for building, or rebuilding, societies 
where violent conflict is the exception, not the rule.
I’d like to ask School of Peace Studies Instructor Topher McDougal – who 
has consulted for various organizations, including the World Bank and the 
International Rescue Committee, on private sector development, urban 
economics and public finance in postwar and developing countries – to 




Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies
Thank you, Dee. It has been an honor for me to spend quite a bit of time 
with tonight’s speaker as he moved around campus today, meeting with 
students, faculty and media. Just keeping up with him I look a little bit worse 
for wear, but he’s still dapper, cogent and seemingly going strong. 
Raymond Offenheiser’s biography is in your program, so instead of his CV 
I’d like to focus on the great resonance that Mr. Offenheiser’s life’s work has 
with the mission and goals of the Joan B. Kroc School of Peace Studies here 
at the University of San Diego. In his capacity as president of Oxfam America 
for the past 13 years, Mr. Offenheiser has overseen that organization’s 
tremendous growth and transition from a more strictly program-oriented 
humanitarian relief organization to a rights-based development and advocacy 
organization with great visibility and influence. 
Moreover, Mr. Offenheiser – who was a peace studies undergraduate minor 
at Notre Dame by the way – is acutely aware of the intimate link between 
development and peacebuilding. In fact, just yesterday Mr. Offenheiser 
was recounting to me and a few others what sounded like a harrowing 
experience in a bomb attack in Lima, Peru, while working on an agricultural 
development program there. Ironically enough, the attack was carried out 
by the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path rebels, who arguably grew out of 
a frustration over rural-urban development disparities.
In any case, many of the countries in which Oxfam now operates are affected 
by conflicts, whether violent or otherwise. Oxfam America therefore sees 
equitable development as entailing the strengthening of civil society, providing 
the channels for conflict to resolve in non-violent, more constructive ways. 
So you can see that Mr. Offenheiser’s career as a development professional 
echoes the four major specialization areas that the Kroc School has identified 
in our master’s program: development, human rights, human security and 
conflict resolution. 
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In addition, Oxfam’s intellectual organizational culture and its willingness 
to wrestle with many of the larger policy questions, even as it engages on 
the ground level programmatically, echoes the Kroc School’s own mandate 
to both study and make peace, and to produce graduates who are reflective 
practitioners and also practicing scholars. 
We are honored to be able to host just such a role model of reflective practice 
here this evening. Please join me in a very warm welcome for Mr. Raymond 
Offenheiser. 
Aid That Works:  
A 21st Century Vision
for U.S. Foreign Assistance
Raymond Offenheiser
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Thank you, Dee, for your warm welcome, and Topher, for that kind 
introduction. I’m honored to be here at the University of San Diego in no 
small part to honor the legacy of philanthropist and activist Joan Kroc, in 
whose name this wonderful center is named and dedicated. I didn’t know 
Joan personally, but in learning about her I’m fairly certain that we would 
have been fast friends. For one thing, I think it’s probably fair to say we 
shared a common passion. 
As Topher said, I was one of the first graduates of the Kellogg Peace Studies 
Program at the University of Notre Dame, which was founded by its president 
at the time, Father Theodore Hesburgh, during the height of campus turmoil 
over the Vietnam War. In the mid-‘80s, Joan heard Father Hesburgh, a former 
member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, speak out against the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation, and shortly thereafter she gave $6 million to 
establish an institute dedicated to the study of peace and conflict resolution 
at Notre Dame. And then she gave another $6 million. And then another $5 
million. And finally a $50 million gift, the single largest gift in Notre Dame’s 
history. 
When she passed away in 2003, a Washington Post tribute to Joan recalled 
how she liked to describe herself as a “maverick salvationist.” At the time, 
her gift of $1.5 billion to the Salvation Army was the largest philanthropic 
donation in American history. The sheer size of that gift and others – the 
scale of her philanthropy – is what she is often remembered for. 
But the style of her philanthropy had an equally large impact, and one that I 
especially appreciate. Some 20th century philanthropists set up foundations. 
Joan thought that was too much paperwork. She preferred to make targeted, 
generous gifts – without formality or fanfare – to organizations she believed 
could make a difference, hence her gift to establish this institute here. In this 
way, as the Post noted, Joan was not only a maverick salvationist, but also a 
maverick philanthropist. 
Oxfam embodies a similar maverick spirit that characterizes our work around 
the world. As an NGO that champions poverty alleviation and human rights, 
we try to bring the voices of the poor to the tables where decisions are made. 
This has been part of our heritage since our very founding by a group of 
Oxford University scholars, Quakers and humanitarians during the darkest 
days of World War II. These citizens of conscience formed a coalition to 
lobby the Allied High Command to assist Greek refugees whose food and 
fuel had been confiscated by the Nazis, and who, as a consequence, faced 
starvation in the winter of 1942. Eventually, Oxfam convinced the British 
and U.S. governments to permit and facilitate humanitarian shipments to 
Greece, during a wartime embargo, and enabled Oxfam to feed and clothe 
the abandoned refugees. 
Today, almost 60 years later, there are Oxfam International affiliates in 14 
different countries. Together we spend almost $900 million annually in some 
110 countries, supporting the work of some 4,000 indigenous nonprofit 
organizations. In practice, this means we have 400 staff in the refugee camps 
of Darfur providing water, sanitation facilities and food. It means that we are 
frontline responders to natural disasters like the Asian tsunami, the Katrina 
and Rita hurricanes and the recent earthquake in Haiti. It means that we 
work with organizations around the world that seek to address problems of 
poverty and injustice through programs of agricultural production, public 
health, microfinance and human rights. It means we conduct public education 
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and consciousness-raising through schools, churches and community groups 
across America.
We don’t consider this charity work. We see it as empowering people, 
communities and nations to undertake transformative social change that 
hopefully will positively affect the lives of millions of people. And while 
that may sound a little ambitious, who would have thought that when a little 
drive-thru hamburger joint first opened in San Bernardino 60 years ago, one 
day you would be able to buy a Big Mac 9,000 miles away in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia, or Riga, Latvia, or Lahore, Pakistan? More to the point, who would 
have thought that the proceeds from that little fast food joint could one day 
finance the study and pursuit of social justice?4 
          
“We don’t consider this charity work. We see it as empowering 
people, communities and nations to undertake transformative 
social change ...”
          
In doing this work, I am often reminded of the wonderful Flannery O’Connor 
quote: “You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you odd.” I have 
spent my entire professional career being odd, looking – as Joan did – for 
a better way to connect the dots on behalf of the common good. I grew up 
in the segregated South during the early years of the civil rights movement. 
After college I worked with youth gangs in tough inner-city neighborhoods 
of Philadelphia. Then I spent six months milking cows on a poor Israeli 
kibbutz where I learned a lot about Israel’s birth, the Palestinians’ plight and 
what it takes to make a desert bloom.
This led me to a graduate program in International Agriculture at Cornell 
University during the peak of the Green Revolution, where I could combine 
an intellectual interest in social change and hunger with a practical program 
of study in the agricultural sciences. If anyone here wants to talk about 
raising cattle in the tropics, I’m your guy. I went on to serve at Save the 
Children, the Inter-American Foundation and the Ford Foundation. 
Working in Brazil and Chile during their democratic transitions, I saw 
firsthand the hunger for democracy and the power citizens possess to force 
even the most powerful military governments to yield to their wishes. In 
Bangladesh, I worked closely with Muhammad Yunus, who is today a good 
friend and partner in spreading his Nobel Prize-winning work on microcredit 
to developing nations around the globe. 
I’ve been privileged to live the values I learned from my Catholic high school 
and college alma maters, and I’ve loved every minute of this work. But I’m 
also reminded every day how much remains to be done, so it’s wonderful 
to be here with all of you to talk about a 21st century vision for U.S. foreign 
assistance. In our time together tonight I want to cover three things. First, 
I want to share Oxfam’s perspective on poverty. Next, why we think our 
current aid system is broken. And finally, what we think America must do to 
make it work – for good. 
                                                              
4  Joan Kroc’s husband, Ray Kroc, was the founder of McDonald’s. Offenheiser talks with Peace and Justice Studies master’s students Veronica Geretz and Tiffany Robertson
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Let’s start with poverty. Most people, if asked, would define poverty as a 
lack of resources. But it’s clear in our world today that we’re not necessarily 
lacking in resources. In fact, we have more resources, more growth and more 
development than ever before. In the midst of the economic crisis of 2008, 
The Economist published a rather contrarian article noting several trend lines 
with respect to global poverty. For example, in the past 25 years, they wrote, 
420 million people in China have escaped extreme poverty thanks to that 
country’s explosive growth. Child mortality worldwide has declined by 25 
percent since 1990. In Southeast Asia, twice as many people now have access 
to clean drinking water. 
And while this past decade was economically disastrous for America and the 
West, it was a time of surging economic growth for the world’s poor. Today, 
half of the world lives in nations whose economies are growing at 7 percent 
or more each year – a rate of expansion at which these economies will 
effectively double in size every 10 years. The result is equally impressive: The 
proportion of extremely poor people in the developing world was almost 
halved between 1990 and 2004, from 31 percent to 19 percent.5
While significant, most of this growth has come in China and India while 
African nations have fallen behind. So despite this enormous progress, 2 billion 
people today are still scraping by on less than $2 per day. Eight-hundred-and-
fifty million people cannot get a glass of clean water to drink. One billion 
people are chronically hungry. And every minute we spend together tonight, 
a woman will die in childbirth and 20 children under the age of five will die 
of malnutrition and disease, simply because they are poor.
I often cite these numbers, but in the aggregate they can be a bit bewildering 
– so let’s try to put them in some perspective. Imagine this room as a 
microcosm of humanity. There are about 300 of us here tonight. There are 
probably 10 of us who would be Americans, 12 of us would be Europeans 
and 30 of us are starving. Thirty-six of us are between the ages of 15 and 24, 
but only nine are getting a college education.6 Among those of us who are 
adults, one in four women cannot read. And overall, 78 of us have no access 
to sanitation. Looking around at our virtual globe, the world would appear 
clearly unjust. Resources are distributed unequally. Opportunity is distributed 
unequally. Prosperity is distributed unequally.
          
“Poverty, to us, is not the absence of resources ... . Poverty is about 
the presence of injustice, the presence of social exclusion, the 
presence of systemic frameworks and practices that trap the poor at 
the bottom of the ladder.”
          
This is how Oxfam sees the world. Poverty, to us, is not the absence of resources. 
And it is certainly not the absence of ingenuity or hard work on the part of 
the poor. Poverty is about the presence of injustice, the presence of social 
exclusion, the presence of systemic frameworks and practices that trap the poor 
at the bottom of the ladder. And it’s about the lack of access to opportunities 
and services that would allow them to break the cycle of poverty.
Very often, governments have money to provide public goods to wealthy and 
middle-class citizens, but they don’t necessarily invest the funds in ways that 
advantage the broad population. Onerous credit terms prevent the poor from 
borrowing to start a business or saving for a rainy day. The poor are excluded 
from education because school fees are often too high or because there are 
no schools in rural areas – or for as simple a reason as no toilets for girls. 
Health care for the poor is grossly underfunded or privatized, excluding the 
most vulnerable and subjecting them to otherwise preventable disease. 
Add this all up and you find that poverty equals powerlessness. And the only 
way to address the root of poverty, therefore, is to empower. That’s what 
Oxfam seeks to do. We work directly with poor communities to address the 
                                                              
5  “The world’s silver lining,” The Economist, Jan. 26 - Feb. 1, 2008. 
6  Youth population (18 percent) from www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/quanda.htm#2; tertiary education 
statistics from UNESCO.
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barriers that exclude them from opportunity and access – and support them 
to change the unjust systems that are holding them back. We also work in 
Washington to end those U.S. policies that have a negative impact on poor 
countries and to strengthen those U.S. policies that could do the most to 
support poor countries. 
          
“... prioritizing poverty alleviation is more than just a matter of 
conscience: It’s actually a matter of global security. The bottom 
billion who struggle for survival every single day are a vulnerable 
mass that can be easily swept into conflict, mass migration or 
political upheaval, rapidly destabilizing entire regions of the world.”
          
Some might say it’s a futile endeavor – that the poor will always be with us. 
Certainly there are times when we feel like David against an army of Goliaths, 
but Oxfam believes that poverty is not a preordained human condition but 
rather a human invention, and therefore we have both a moral responsibility 
and a practical ability to eradicate it. We also believe that prioritizing poverty 
alleviation is more than just a matter of conscience: It’s actually a matter of 
global security. The bottom billion who struggle for survival every single day 
are a vulnerable mass that can be easily swept into conflict, mass migration 
or political upheaval, rapidly destabilizing entire regions of the world. And 
it’s true that today leaders in our security and intelligence establishment have 
actually recognized this.
That is why U.S. development assistance, the topic I want to talk about 
tonight, is so important. The stakes are incredibly high. And when U.S. 
foreign assistance is used to fight poverty effectively, it builds a safer, more 
prosperous world for everyone – even as it bolsters our standing as Americans 
and our moral authority abroad. When aid is done poorly, however, it fails 
to deliver any lasting results. It wastes precious resources and undermines 
American leadership and values. Even worse, it can erode the trust that poor 
people abroad have in their own governments, perpetuate the systems that 
contribute to poverty in the first place and further destabilize the developing 
world.
I’m sorry to say that, today, U.S. aid is far from reaching its true potential. 
For all our good intentions, our government persists in counterproductive 
behaviors that serve American taxpayers poorly and, too often, fail to serve the 
poor. To boil it down, I’d say our system suffers from four key deficiencies: It 
is outdated, incoherent, more directive than collaborative, and it emphasizes 
the wrong priorities – to the detriment of poverty alleviation abroad and our 
national security at home. 
I think it’s fair to say most Americans have no idea that our foreign assistance 
is still governed by a law that is older than many of you here. But, can you 
imagine trying to find your way around today’s world with a map that was 
drawn in 1961? That’s effectively what our development strategy today amounts 
to: We’re charting our course with a guide that was crafted almost half a century 
ago. It’s like asking today’s university students to research and write a term 
paper with a card catalog, a stack of index cards and a manual Smith Corona 
typewriter. And yet even if our tools here were state of the art, the truth is the 
Foreign Assistance Act has failed to achieve even its original intent. 
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In 1961, President Kennedy hoped that this law would streamline and rationalize 
our aid. As he said at the time, and I quote, “No objective supporter of foreign aid 
can be satisfied with the existing program – actually a multiplicity of programs. 
Bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow, its administration is diffused 
over a haphazard, irrational structure, covering at least four departments and 
several other agencies. The program is based on a series of legislative measures 
and administrative procedures conceived at different times and for different 
purposes, many of them now obsolete and inconsistent and unduly rigid, and 
thus unsuited for our present needs and purposes.”
Kennedy took action to address this problem in 1961; he created a single, 
strong agency that unified all development assistance with separate authorities 
and budgets, and a complementary but distinct role from the U.S. Department 
of State. Unfortunately, the problem that President Kennedy hoped to fix 
in 1961 has gotten even worse. Today the Foreign Assistance Act lists 140 
different goals and priorities, 400 different directives – and these directives 
are executed by at least 12 departments of the U.S. government – 25 agencies 
and some 60 government offices. This tangled mess confuses rather than 
guides our aid implementation.
Let’s just take Afghanistan for a moment as one particular example, and 
perhaps the most important development arena for U.S foreign policy. With 
at least eight different U.S. government agencies on the ground, U.S. military, 
political and development efforts are coordinated only when officials make a 
special effort to talk to one another. When they don’t, and in truth they often 
don’t, they work across purposes. They burden local officials with too many 
meetings, they waste taxpayers’ money and they fail to keep our promises to 
the Afghan people. 
USAID is supposed to lead our development in Afghanistan, yet it is asked to 
manage billion dollar budgets with a skeletal, high turnover staff. Instead of 
deepening their knowledge of the culture, politics, language and priorities of 
Afghans, USAID staff has time only to shovel out the money. 
It is little surprise then that over 50 percent of USAID funding goes to five 
American for-profit contractors, who in turn spend a significant portion of that 
money on U.S. consultants. In the meantime, we provide only limited support 
to the Afghan government itself to demonstrate to the Afghan people that 
it can effectively, legitimately lead the nation. Granted, Afghanistan is a war 
zone, rife with logistical, political and social challenges. Unfortunately, our 
aid policies are often counterproductive, even in relatively stable nations.
          
“... over 50 percent of USAID funding [in Afghanistan] goes to five 
American for-profit contractors, who in turn spend a significant 
portion of that money on U.S. consultants.”
          
Now let’s take Bangladesh for example, a country where seven out of every 
100 children still die before their fifth birthday. We give $80 million per year 
in foreign assistance to Bangladesh. And while that may sound like a lot, it’s 
about one-tenth of what Americans were expected to spend on Valentine’s 
Day cards this year. At the same time, we charge the Bangladeshi government 
half a billion dollars in tariffs for products that Bangladeshis produce for 
export. That’s 40 percent more than we charge France, despite the fact that 
we import more than 12 times as much in dollar terms from France. Our 
failure to think strategically about development within our own government 
means we’re constantly pushing a metaphorical boulder up a mountain of 
our own making. 
Contrast the lack of coherence in this context with our obsessive control in 
other areas. In Mozambique, for example, a study by Senator Richard Lugar 
found that 150 USAID staff spent more than 600 days producing reports 
on their work – 600 days they could have actually spent doing that work. 
They produced reports on program audits, reports on earmarks, reports on 
financial integrity. They even produced something called, believe it or not, a 
report on reports. And soon they’re probably going to need a report on that 
one as well.
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A side counterpart to our micromanagement of aid workers is our pension for 
posing congressional earmarks that often speak more to our own priorities 
than those of the people we’re trying to help. Oxfam has seen cases where 
U.S. aid workers were forced to build schools when what the country really 
needed was teachers for the classrooms it already had, or cases where U.S. 
congressional projects trumped local environmental priorities. 
While Kenya, for example, was reeling from a governance crisis that 
destabilized most of East Africa, 85 to 90 percent of our assistance to Kenya was 
earmarked for HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention. HIV/AIDS is undoubtedly 
a priority, to be sure, but how can you effectively deliver health services in a 
country where ethnic violence has broken out? Hundreds of people had been 
killed in the streets and hundreds of thousands more had been displaced 
by the conflict, so having our funding locked into a specific use certainly 
reduces its impact. It’s about as sensible as earmarking 90 percent of San 
Diego’s disaster funds for flood control. Yes, it’s a problem, possibly, but not 
the only or the most strategic problem you face here locally. 
Finally, and especially over this last decade, the aim of our foreign assistance 
has been skewed. In an age when our nation is preoccupied with combating 
fundamentalism and terrorism, fighting poverty has become subordinated to 
those goals instead of being integral to them. The security establishment in 
Washington recognizes that persistent poverty can alienate populations from 
states, increase the risk of civil conflict and erode weak states’ capacity to 
govern. Secretary [of Defense Robert] Gates has been particularly eloquent 
on this point. 
And in the post-Cold War world, we also understand that America’s greatest 
security threats will come not from strong states, but from failing ones. And 
that’s why policy makers and analysts increasingly call for smart power, 
which means combining the hard power of the U.S. military with the tools in 
our soft power arsenal. 
In the parlance of Washington, this new comprehensive approach to security 
threats is called the “3-Ds,” which stands for defense, diplomacy and 
development. But right now the three legs of the security stool are woefully 
lopsided. Of the total outlays for national security in 2007, 95 percent was for 
defense and just 3.5 percent was for development. One of every three U.S. 
foreign assistance dollars today goes to countries that are political allies in 
the war on terror or the war on drugs. 
Instead of fighting poverty where it exists, we’re fighting it where the U.S. 
government is already fighting. Meanwhile, just one of every 16 dollars 
of development aid is actually spent on the world’s 10 poorest countries. 
The entirety of all of our aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 1961 and 2005 
amounted to only about half of what we spent for military operations and 
reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007 alone.
          
“The entirety of all of our aid to sub-Saharan Africa between 
1961 and 2005 amounted to only about half of what we spent for 
military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
2007 alone.”
          
When Oxfam sees the Department of Defense playing a greater role in 
setting foreign aid priorities while our civilian agencies suffer from depleted 
capacity and resources in the field, we genuinely believe that our short-term 
tactical concerns are trumping our long-term strategic interests in poverty 
alleviation. When we see the military using foreign aid as a force multiplier 
and diplomats using it to persuade a foreign government to cooperate with 
us politically, experience in the field tells us that we cannot expect poverty 
alleviation to result. But Oxfam’s experience also tells us that whether our 
nation fights poverty for moral reasons or to improve its own security, truly 
effective foreign assistance will only happen when we are fighting poverty 
for its own sake. 
So that’s why Oxfam is calling for a more intelligent balance among the three 
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Ds. We believe that it is through reducing global poverty that we will eventually 
counter the threat of instability. And it is through improving poor people’s 
lives that we will earn their trust and build the diplomatic partnerships we 
need to secure our national interests. In other words, fighting global poverty 
must be development’s singular priority, singular goal and singular focus. It 
must be a U.S. foreign policy objective in and of itself – an objective that is 
not subservient but essential to our security and other national interests. 
And if we’re going to do this work coherently, consistently and collaboratively, 
we need a national strategy for global development that defines that singular 
mission, establishes the principles to help to achieve it and coordinates our 
government to get it done. This is the starting point. 
The good news is that a consensus has emerged on the need for foreign 
assistance reform. Voices across the spectrum in Washington are calling 
for a renewed approach, from the bipartisan HELP Commission7 launched 
by President [George W.] Bush and scholars, think tanks, practitioners and 
members of Congress like California’s own Howard Berman to President 
Obama himself. For those of you unfamiliar with the pace of consensus 
building in the development space in Washington, this is akin to a blue 
moon, pigs flying and the San Diego Padres winning the World Series all on 
the same day. The degree of agreement around the need for reform and the 
types of reform needed is unprecedented, and therefore this is, in our minds, 
a moment of tremendous opportunity for those of us who care deeply about 
human rights and social justice.
From Oxfam’s perspective, a new strategy for development should start with 
the simple recognition that the answer to global poverty lies with the people 
in the developing world and their governments. We need to help governments 
and citizens find ways to finance and meet their own development needs. 
The end goal of our foreign aid policy, after all, should be to render itself 
unnecessary. But to get there, we need to deliver aid in a way that strengthens 
rather than undermines the relationship between citizens and governments 
in poor countries. To that end, we believe that a national strategy for global 
development should be informed by three important principles.
The first principle is that our national strategy should give poor people what 
they actually need. Now, this seems like a rather self-evident concept, but as 
I noted earlier, we often fail to stop and listen to the people we are trying to 
help. Let me give an example. 
Several years ago, $30 million in U.S. aid was appropriated to deliver roofing 
timbers to people in Afghanistan’s central highlands. According to an NGO 
on the ground, the agency in Geneva meant to oversee the project took 20 
percent of the $30 million for administrative costs and then sub-contracted 
to another NGO in Washington, D.C., that took another 20 percent, which in 
turn sub-contracted to an Afghan NGO that took another 20 percent. Then 
they paid money to a trucking company in Iran to haul the timber. Once 
the timber arrived, it was found to be of no use as roofing timber for the 
villagers. In fact, it proved to be too heavy for the mud-brick walls of their 
homes. So the villagers chopped the wood up and used it as firewood. 
          
“... when poor people are put in charge of their own development, 
we can have a tangible, positive impact on their lives.”
          
In other words, our failure to pay attention to what people truly needed 
meant American development dollars literally went up in smoke. But when 
poor people are put in charge of their own development, we can have a 
tangible, positive impact on their lives. 
In contrast, a success story in Afghanistan is what is called the National 
Solidarity Program. In 2003, this program gave rural villages ownership over 
their own economic development. One village in Afghanistan, Dadi Khel, 
is in the mountains near the Pakistani border, where the Taliban insurgents 
                                                              
7  HELP stands for “Helping to Enhance the Livelihood of People around the Globe.”
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were recruiting economically isolated villagers. As part of the National 
Solidarity Program, villagers chose to build their own hydropower plant that 
would bring electricity to about 300 families. The villagers recorded, in a very 
transparent manner, government aid disbursements for the entire community 
to see, reinforcing the relationship between citizens and their government. 
What’s more, the Taliban feel less comfortable attacking village-led projects 
than they do clearly branded foreign aid initiatives. 
A second critical principle to a new national development strategy is choosing 
the right benchmarks for success. When measuring results, we need a field 
perspective that looks at development outcomes, not a bean-counting, box-
checking Washington perspective that only tallies inputs and outputs. 
But within that framework, we’ll also have some important decisions to make 
about whether the outcomes we see should be immediate or long term. Do 
we, for example, choose to meet the needs of vulnerable populations for vital 
goods and services today? This is the thrust of current programs like PEPFAR, 
the acronym for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, through 
which the United States provides life-extending antiretroviral treatments 
that have enabled some 2.4 million individuals with HIV to reclaim their 
future. Or, do we invest in building more durable capacity of states, citizens 
and markets to deliver outcomes over time, like promoting educational and 
preventive health care systems that could help shield people from getting 
diseases like HIV in the first place?
          
“... when it comes to development, our concern for speed and
output is undermining our ability to take a long view and get 
durable results.”
          
Today, America increasingly chooses the quick win. I think we do that in 
part because, as Americans, we are impatient for results. We have a business 
sector that lives and dies by the logic of quarterly returns. Our high-tech 
sector runs on creative overdrive, always looking for the new thing. Even 
Joan Kroc acquired her fortune thanks to our appetite for fast food. But when 
it comes to development, our concern for speed and output is undermining 
our ability to take a long view and get durable results. 
So as we ask ourselves the tough questions about where taxpayers’ dollars 
are best spent, and as we confront the ethical dilemmas inherent in some 
of these choices, we have to keep our eyes on the prize and ensure that 
our tactics are in line with our strategic aim, which is fighting poverty and 
helping others help themselves.
The third and final principle of a national strategy can be summarized 
as ownership: giving those we are trying to help the reins of their own 
development. Because as much as we like to think otherwise, we can’t 
develop people or countries. We can give them some tools, we can give them 
some incentives, but they actually have to develop themselves. In practice, 
the ownership concept begins by transferring information to recipient 
government and citizens – predictable, transparent information about how 
much aid money there is, who it’s coming from and where it’s going. 
Now this sounds grotesquely obvious, and none of us here could manage 
our own organizations or households if we never knew how much money 
we had in the bank or who had access to that account. But in recent studies 
that Oxfam has done, we’ve found that, for example, the government of 
Afghanistan has no idea how one-third of all U.S. aid has been spent since 
2001, which amounts to some $5 billion. In Uganda, a mapping exercise 
in 2005 found twice as much aid being spent as what the government was 
told. The government of Sierra Leone knows little about 265 aid projects that 
donors are aiding in its own country. 
If governments don’t know what’s going on in their own countries, they 
can’t be effective and they can’t be responsible, or even accountable for 
that matter. They can’t plan or manage their poverty alleviation programs, 
or explain to their populations what exactly is going on, or what they’re in 
fact doing. Meanwhile, citizens can’t hold their governments accountable 
50 51
for progress. This has to change. It has to change so aid recipients have an 
ownership stake in their own development, within their own countries.
Second, ownership means transferring capacity to recipient governments and 
citizens. Now some U.S. assistance for capacity building has already worked 
quite well. USAID has helped El Salvador’s legislative assembly emerge 
as an independent institution. It has facilitated important public hearings 
in Mozambique and supported the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s Ministry 
of Finance and central bank, just to give a few examples of the kind of 
institutional investment in capacity that we can take some credit for. But the 
fact is we’re spending one out of every three U.S. aid dollars on technical 
cooperation. And given the scale of that investment, we ought to have more 
to show for our efforts. Why don’t we?
One reason is that USAID is required by law to hire American contractors, 
who often cost 15 to 30 percent more than local contractors from the 
recipient country, even though the goods and services that they receive aren’t 
necessarily any better. The opportunity cost is also too high. Tying aid in 
this way keeps local contractors from using resources that would otherwise 
develop their own capacity and generate economic opportunity within their 
own communities. 
The way to fix this problem is to give our development professionals more 
discretion in solving challenges on the ground, at the coalface if you will. If 
a U.S. consultant knows more about the problem, speaks the language and 
can get the job done, then USAID should have the power to hire her. But if 
she’s being hired and charges more simply because she understands the U.S. 
aid machine, then we have a problem.
Finally, to promote ownership as part of an effective national strategy for 
global development, we need to transfer control to recipient governments 
and citizens. Members of Congress and U.S. officials overseeing foreign 
assistance are often afraid of handing over the keys. But when we weigh 
down our aid with inflexible earmarks and directives, we send the message 
to aid workers that Washington officials don’t trust them to do their jobs. And 
to recipient countries we send the message that they can’t be trusted to know 
what’s best for their own institutions and communities. If the ultimate goal 
of our development assistance is to put ourselves out of business, it’s hard to 
see how this strategy can lead to success.
Oxfam believes we ought to be sending a message of partnership instead. 
At a minimum, we should limit earmarks and presidential initiatives that are 
inconsistent with country priorities. But to lead with best practice, we should 
increase budget support for development purposes to responsible governments 
and let them determine where our limited dollars might be best applied.
I’ve talked a lot about problems tonight, but let me spend a moment on 
success. Earlier in my career I lived in Bangladesh, in the early ‘90s, and I 
saw firsthand what good can come from the kind of approach that I’m talking 
about. You might recall that as recently as 40 years ago the country that is 
now Bangladesh was actually East Pakistan. It was one of the poorest and 
most unstable regions in the world. In 1971, a civil war broke out in Pakistan 
that resulted in the birth of Bangladesh as a nation. 
In the aftermath of that conflict, Henry Kissinger memorably described 
Bangladesh as the world’s “basket case.” He was, at that time, right. 
Bangladesh had seen more than 2 million people killed in its fight to 
become an independent state. Some 2.5 million people fled as refugees 
into neighboring India. There was a massive number of internally displaced 
persons. The nation’s physical, social and agricultural infrastructure couldn’t 
support its exploding population. Political unrest persisted amid three years 
of famines and postwar devastation.  
Fast-forward to the present. You no longer hear about famines in Bangladesh 
because over the years USAID worked with Bangladeshis to build domestic 
agricultural institutions to contend with the nation’s long-term food security 
challenges. You no longer hear about the devastating effects of overpopulation 
in Bangladesh because USAID helped build capacity in the government and 
NGO sectors to support long-term family planning programs and maternal 
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and child health programs. You no longer hear about a deficient civil society 
because USAID invested heavily in Bangladesh’s efforts to build one of the 
most innovative NGO sectors in the world. 
As a result of these and other efforts, you seldom hear about the kind of 
sectarian violence and instability that continue to plague modern-day Pakistan. 
In fact, research shows that while Pakistan and Bangladesh continue to face 
enormous challenges in terms of poverty, economic growth and governance, 
Bangladesh has managed to outperform Pakistan in a number of key social 
indicators. Compared to Bangladesh, women in Pakistan have twice as many 
children, and under-five mortality is 30 percent higher.
          
“... if we have the right priorities and the right approach, American 
foreign assistance can alleviate global poverty and contribute to 
global stability.”
          
Now, comparing the progress of different societies and different cultures is not 
a clean science. Nonetheless, I think this broadly reminds us what works and 
what doesn’t in foreign assistance. Meanwhile, our failed efforts in Pakistan 
– we’ve spent $10 billion in Pakistan on aid over the last decade – driven 
largely by security concerns, demonstrate the need for reform. Our successful 
efforts in Bangladesh, driven by our desire to help the Bangladeshi people 
chart a course of their own development over the long term, demonstrate 
something altogether different: that if we have the right priorities and the 
right approach, American foreign assistance can alleviate global poverty and 
contribute to global stability. 
At Oxfam we believe that there’s a real yearning in America to do this kind 
of work, to engage this challenge – to play this constructive role on the 
world stage and to act on the positive values that we hold as a nation and as 
individuals. Last month [January 2010], as many of you are probably aware, 
despite a prolonged recession and historic unemployment here in the United 
States, American families donated something on the order of $720 million to 
the relief and recovery effort in Haiti. At Oxfam our phones were buzzing off 
the hook, and we received a record number of contributions online. 
Opinion research on support for foreign aid has consistently revealed that the 
American people believe that fighting global poverty is a national and moral 
imperative. And they consistently think that we give more than we do. So as 
a nation we want to give more aid, and we’re comfortable with the idea of 
giving much more than we do. 
But it isn’t a question of spending more money; it’s a question of getting better 
results from the money we spend – results that truly reflect the American 
public’s genuine desire to help. For far too long we’ve settled for far too little 
return on our efforts. What I’d like to see is that we repair this disconnect 
between our values and our actions. And I believe we stand at a crucial 
moment for getting it right. 
Since 9/11, our country has grappled with how to engage in the world. We’ve 
made some choices over the past 10 years that have left us less secure instead 
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Now, as the new administration tries to reframe American engagement with 
the world, we should make the most of the role effective aid can play in 
extending our hand, expressing our values, leading by example – reminding 
the world what our nation stands for, not what it stands against.  
We have a chance to implement this new outlook right away in another 
desperately needy country: our hemispheric neighbor, Haiti. Imagine a Haiti 
where our development efforts begin with a genuine dialogue that empowers 
the Haitian people and those parts of the government with a demonstrated 
commitment to development to own their own renewal. Imagine a Haiti 
where instead of solutions imposed by a distant Washington development 
process, they are driven by the people that we aspire to help. Imagine a Haiti 
where we provide the country transparent and predictable information about 
our aid, facilitating greater accountability between the Haitian government 
and Haitian citizens, and between all Haitians and the U.S. government. 
Imagine a Haiti where our incredible resources work in concert to rescue 
Haitians not only from the ruins of the earthquake, but also from the unjust 
systems that have trapped them in poverty for decades.
As I said at the outset, poverty is about powerlessness. But I believe this 
is a powerful vision for Haiti’s future, for a new kind of U.S. aid and for 
America’s role in building a more peaceful world. And it won’t be easy. Many 
of Haiti’s institutions were weak before the quake and now they’ve literally 
been devastated. But we have an opportunity to start in this new direction 
with one of our closest neighbors – a historic opportunity to get it right. 
Oxfam will continue to champion this vision in Washington and beyond. The 
political constellations are aligned but will require political will and citizen 
engagement to get the job done and get it done right. 
So I hope that you will all find a way to join in this great endeavor. As you 
well know, the institute – and Catholic teaching at its core – understands that 
peace and justice are two sides of the same coin. And if we all were to realize 
of more secure, and have caused our international standing in the world to 
plummet, even among close allies. In nations like Indonesia and Turkey, U.S. 
approval ratings have plummeted from 75 percent before 9/11 to 15 percent 
today – that despite the enthusiasm for President Obama’s election. 
Offenheiser and IPJ Senior Program Officer Diana Kutlow greet IPJ supporter Marta Reilly
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Joan Kroc’s dream to not only talk about peace but to make peace, then we 
have to help make social justice a reality for the global poor as well. 
So I look to you as humanitarians, scholars, students and citizens of deep 
compassion to help reconnect our foreign assistance to our greatest domestic 
ideals. Let’s bridge the divide between our values and our actions, between 
our development inputs and outcomes, and make a difference in the world 
we share – for the poor and for ourselves. Thank you very much.
QuEsTIOns AnD AnsWErs
The audience submitted questions that were read by Deputy Director Dee Aker.
 
DA: Thank you. That was very impressive for those of us who are devoted 
like you are to making this kind of change in our world. You talked about the 
3-D orientation – development, defense and diplomacy – and I’m wondering 
whether or not Oxfam has developed a relation that’s less formalized than going 
to Washington? For example, do you have contact with the military in Haiti? 
There has to be a lot of logistical cooperation for the kind of work that you do 
on the ground. Have you formed a relationship with the military?
RO: Let me be very clear on the way we think about how these three Ds 
should operate and interact with one another. First of all, let me be very, 
very clear that my remarks tonight are in no way an indictment of the U.S. 
defense establishment or the military, per se. What we’re talking about here 
is rebalancing the way these various components of our policy establishment 
interact with one another and how they might complement one another more 
effectively. 
I think there’s probably no better example of how this works than in these 
challenging humanitarian environments. The tsunami is one example where 
the U.S. military played a very important role in providing lift capacity to get 
supplies into Aceh, in Indonesia – into areas that were very, very hard to 
reach. 
In Haiti, Oxfam has a very direct relationship with the U.S. military because 
one of the major places we are providing assistance is on a 9-acre golf course 
on the outskirts of downtown Port-au-Prince, which was basically the golf 
course of the Haitian elite. When the earthquake occurred and the walls fell 
down, the population around it whose houses had collapsed moved into this 
open space. And there are now 70,000 people living in tents on a 9-acre golf 
course. 
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It turns out that the U.S. ambassador’s residence and the Canadian ambassador’s 
residence are on either side of this golf course, and in order to secure the 
property the U.S. Embassy decided to work out an arrangement with the 
owners of the golf course to basically rent the property during the period of 
this humanitarian process and post 400 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne on the 
perimeter. And we are providing water and sanitation facilities to these 70,000 
people, collaborating directly with the 82nd Airborne. 
Their role has been to provide security when we’ve done food deliveries on 
site, in those early days when people were desperate for food and were just 
scrambling to get at whatever food was available. We organized a delivery 
program where we only delivered food to women, and the 82nd Airborne 
collaborated in helping to keep order as those food deliveries went forward. 
And that happened all over Port-au-Prince with both U.N. troops and U.S. 
military. 
So in these situations, international humanitarian law provides clarity about 
what the role of military should be, and in case after case – the Indonesian 
tsunami being one and Haiti being another – there is collaboration in situations 
where we need security and lift capacity from the U.S. military. I would also 
say when you’re out around the city of Port-au-Prince, you don’t see the U.S. 
military running patrols. They are operating within a very narrow humanitarian 
mission and trying to provide security to enable the humanitarian process to 
be effectively executed. That’s the role that they’re playing and they’re doing 
a very impressive job.  
DA: Are there significant differences in U.S. aid policy to Latin America and 
Africa? If so, what are they and what has been the effect, given your experience 
and long history in Latin America and now your global perspective with 
Oxfam?
RO: Many aid agencies – not only U.S. government aid agencies but also 
European agencies – have moved, in effect, largely out of Latin America and 
into Africa and South Asia. We’re in conversations with a number of our 
European Oxfam colleagues and are seeing an accelerating trend of European 
donors who have been in Latin America for literally decades leaving for Africa 
and for South Asia. 
I think the perspective is that many Latin American countries have become 
middle income countries with solid democratic systems, and that much of the 
need for the kind of aid that was historically provided is maybe no longer 
needed. The places where the aid is still being substantially provided in the 
hemisphere are Bolivia and Haiti, but otherwise there’s a lot of withdrawal 
from the hemisphere and a lot of focus on Africa as the place where aid 
funding should be concentrated.
The other thing that’s driving it is the concern about failing states, so many 
of the governments in Europe are thinking a lot more about what kind of 
presence they should have in a place like Somalia and some of the more 
fragile states around Africa. Should they really be ramping up their efforts to 
make a difference in those contexts? When they look at those contexts relative 
to Latin America, I think they think they need to prioritize African nations. 
DA: When governmental leaders take USAID money for their own purposes, 
their own bank accounts, how can we turn over control of aid to countries, as 
you were suggesting?
RO: Corruption has been a real problem in the aid system for decades. And 
frankly, if we go back to the Cold War era, I think one of the great problems 
of how we did aid during that time was that we were in a bipolar world and 
trying to buy client states, competing with the Russians. We were oftentimes 
overlooking who it was we were actually supporting, in terms of some of 
their political practices and how they used the money and whether the money 
actually got to people. 
Some of the really exciting things that have been happening over the last 
decade, which gives me a little bit of confidence that we can do this a bit 
differently, is the emergence of Transparency International and efforts to really 
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focus on the question of transparency in governance. There’s a whole effort 
to focus on budget transparency with a lot of new NGOs in many developing 
countries that are actually tracking the budgets of their governments. These 
are things that are new, and what they’re doing is enabling civil society and 
citizens’ groups to hold their governments accountable for how funds are being 
expended in their national context. This is the kind of thing we’ve needed for 
a long time. At Oxfam we believe, in some sense, that effective development is 
about effective states, active citizens and inclusive markets – and that you need 
all three working together and interacting in a dynamic way. And we need to 
empower citizens to have the tools to hold their governments accountable in 
order to avoid the kind of corrupt practices we’ve seen in the past. 
DA: One of our students would like you to share an example of how Oxfam is 
ensuring local capacity building, empowerment and investment in local business 
in their relief work in Haiti.
Offenheiser assesses a camp in Haiti after the earthquake (Photo courtesy of Oxfam America)
RO: One of the big challenges in the Haiti reconstruction process once we get 
beyond the short-term relief is going to be rebuilding the Haitian economy. 
Right now some initial steps are happening where many aid organizations are 
providing cash for work, just to give people enough money to get by, buy 
food and meet basic needs. 
Already there’s a very vigorous conversation going on about what we are 
going to do beyond this short-term relief phase. And what are we going to 
do that would represent the kind of development vision that I was talking 
about in my remarks, and actually invigorate the Haitian economy? There 
are discussions about if it’s possible, for example, to really change a pattern 
of disinvestment in the agriculture sector in Haiti and shift a lot more money 
into the agricultural sector and areas where Haiti might have some productive 
opportunities. 
For example, Haiti actually produces quality coffee. They don’t produce 
enough of it to be taken seriously by the coffee industry in the United States, 
but what if the sector were invested in as it was in Rwanda? After the terrible 
nightmare in Rwanda, Starbucks invested heavily in persuading the Rwandans 
that they actually had high quality coffee and needed to produce more of it, 
and Starbucks would help it find its way into the international market. Now 
there’s a very dynamic coffee export business coming out of Rwanda and 
they’re making a considerable amount of income on that. Could something 
like that happen with Haiti? 
Before the earthquake occurred there was significant change in U.S. legislation 
with regard to trade with Haiti. Haiti obviously has the comparable advantage 
to being right offshore of the United States, and it had garment industries that 
were creating something like 25,000 to 30,000 jobs in greater Port-au-Prince. 
But one of the problems was that the policies about the sourcing of the raw 
materials they were using to make the garments limited the ability of the 
Haitians to import into the United State. Under a new act called the HOPE8 Act 
II that Congress has passed, a lot of these restrictions have been dropped and 
                                                              
8  Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement
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now there’s an opportunity for Haiti to become much more active as a textile 
producer and exporter in the U.S. economy, which would really invigorate 
some of the urban sector.
There are a variety of other areas where we’re thinking about how things 
can change – rice production in Haiti for example. Over the last 20 years, 
paradoxically, because we subsidize our rice producers here in the United 
States, we started dumping large amounts of subsidized rice into Haiti. We 
completely changed the diet of the Haitian people. As a consequence of that 
we undermined the agricultural sector, which precipitated mass migration to 
Port-au-Prince – that’s why Port-au-Prince has 3.5 million people in it. And we 
completely killed the agricultural sector in Haiti. 
So, one of the questions is: Are we going to continue dumping subsidized rice 
from our U.S. agricultural sector into Haiti and have that kind of devastating 
effect? It’s again one of those examples of: Is this in our national interest, or 
are our trade policy and our aid policy at odds with one another?
These are some of the areas where we think organizations like Oxfam and 
other multilateral and bilateral donors need to be making investments to 
generate jobs and economic vitality in a new Haiti.  
DA: Undoubtedly in Oxfam’s efforts on the ground you’ve had the chance to 
work with multilateral aid efforts, but what about the U.N. agencies? Does the 
U.N. foreign assistance apparatus suffer the same weaknesses? Is it broken too, 
such as the description you were just giving?
RO: One of the things I’m most fond of saying about the United Nations is: If 
we didn’t have it, we’d have to create it. There’s a lot that U.N. systems do for 
all of us in terms of enabling dialogue and coordinating all sorts of activities 
on a global level that we’ve gotten used to living with and probably would 
have difficulty living without. 
Speaking specifically about the kind of role that the United Nations might play 
in these large humanitarian responses, it’s the U.N.’s role in these situations 
to actually coordinate the overall response to any large-scale humanitarian 
emergency, be it the tsunami or the Haitian earthquake. 
For organizations like Oxfam, one of the things we insisted on to the United 
Nations – and I participated in a number of meetings with Security Council 
members some years ago on this – was that the United Nations play a much, 
much stronger role in coordinating all of the agencies that are actually on the 
ground doing this work. In many of these contexts before that it was sort of 
mass chaos. U.N. agencies were competing with each other, and NGOs were 
competing with each other as well. We were creating as much chaos as there 
already was on the ground when our role really was to impose order. 
Now there is an organization within the United Nations called the Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. That was the body that was actually 
on the ground in Haiti at the airport coordinating all of the work that we do. 
Within that body there are a variety of clusters for the different work needed 
in any kind of humanitarian emergency – for food delivery, protection, shelter, 
water and sanitation. Those of us who do this sort of work basically look to 
that system to help us figure out what we’re going to do and how we’re going 
to do it. Then within that system, some of our NGO sister organizations are 
given specific roles to coordinate within those clusters. 
In Haiti, this has been working. This is actually up and operating despite 
the fact that – and this is one thing that perhaps is overlooked – the United 
Nations had the largest loss of its personnel in the earthquake in Haiti of 
any place on earth in its history. It lost its senior leadership that was in a 
meeting when the building and their headquarters collapsed. They literally 
had to fly people in to replace the senior leadership in order to run this entire 
response. So you had a traumatized U.N. system trying to respond to what 
is acknowledged now as the largest humanitarian calamity in the recorded 
history of the Western Hemisphere, when you look at it on a per capita basis 
of the impact on the country and the population.
In the work that we do in the humanitarian sphere, we rely on the United 
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Nations and have, I think, seen significant improvements in the way it works. 
There are other areas where I could probably be critical, but I also think it’s 
fair to say that the United Nations is actually leading this discussion on aid 
effectiveness that I’ve spoken about tonight, through a variety of international 
meetings that have been taking place. 
To be totally honest with you, and I didn’t say this in my remarks, most 
European nations have adopted most of the principles that I was espousing in 
my remarks. The United States has actually lagged; we’re probably five to 10 
years behind in the way we’re responding. But the United Nations is leading 
that discussion on aid effectiveness, so I think on balance I’m a supporter of 
the United Nations, and a supporter of multilateralism more generally.
DA: Now that we’ve got the big picture of multilaterals and nation states, what 
role do you see the private sector playing in peace and prosperity worldwide? 
What kinds of small business solutions have you seen pull people out of poverty 
and avoid conflict?
RO: I think one of the big transitions that’s taken place in the world we’re 
in today has to do with the fact that we’re living in an ever more globalized 
world, an ever more integrated world, a world where trade has become the 
lingua franca that’s linking many nations together in more of a boundary-less 
globe. 
One of the things we at Oxfam began to realize was that we had been born 
within a post-World War II, Cold War foreign aid framework and that we had 
oftentimes focused on the foreign aid question and the investments in foreign 
aid as where the action really was and the important areas of investment. But 
over time we’ve realized that foreign aid as a percent of overall foreign direct 
investment globally was less than 10 percent and declining. 
We also realized that in the developing world today, foreign direct investment 
from the private sector is really shaping the opportunity horizons for the poor 
all over the world, and organizations like ours needed to be focusing much, 
much more on the private sector, both international corporations and the 
emergent private sector in developing countries. 
So we’ve created a unit within our organization to focus on this and have 
entered the whole area of corporate responsibility as part of the way we view 
development in the broad 21st century context. What we see though is that 
we’ve got to enter this world focused on which private sector areas make a 
difference to the poor, positively or negatively.
For example, extractive industries: All over Africa there are corporations 
seeking opportunities for oil, gas and mining. There’s a big rush of Chinese 
companies into Africa now, and it’s quite dramatic. Western companies that 
have been used to taking for granted their access to these geographies are 
suddenly saying, “Well, we’ve got to get in there and compete.” So there’s a 
bit of a resource rush in African nations today. 
Part of that is precipitated by the fact that in much of the world the mining 
and oil and gas companies have perhaps exhausted the supplies and access 
to resources that were available decades in the past, and now they’re realizing 
that the large, cheap, volume sources of many strategic minerals and other 
resources are available in Africa. 
The problem is that very often wherever we’ve seen extractive industries we 
also see large volumes of money moving. We see corruption, we see lack of 
transparency and we see perhaps the undermining of democratic governance 
– and there we see conflict. 
What we try to do is get in that field, work with the private sector, talk 
about these issues and talk about a new order of standards for how extractive 
industries might work in a more helpful way in a developing country context. 
There are other areas where we started working with the pharmaceutical 
industry on access to medicines, making them more affordable for the poor 
in developing countries. 
I think the real challenge going forward is going to be: How do we work 
more in partnership on the development of the private sector in developing 
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countries in ways that are going to be inclusive of poor communities and 
not exclusive of them? I think we’re still in the early stages of the kinds of 
programs we might implement in that area. 
I’ll just give you one quick example from Haiti of the kind of thing that might 
be involved in that. There is a company in Haiti that produces yogurt and 
cheese products, and Oxfam is working with this company to actually broaden 
the supply of milk and yogurt in the country to the population. It turns out 
that this particular company has a contract with the government to supply 
some milk products to the school system, so it has one fixed government 
contract that supports a portion of its business. 
What we’re trying to do is link more farmers in a broader geography in Haiti 
to that producer so that we actually build the dairy industry in Haiti. It’s 
an interesting public-private partnership where it’s about market access, the 
ability of a private company to actually benefit a larger poor population, and 
trying to share benefits across these kinds of boundaries.
DA: Is democracy necessary to sustain development and prolong peace?
RO: There’s always someone who asks the meaning of life question. I think 
that’s a complex question. It’s interesting to look at China and think about the 
statistics I cited to you earlier about the numbers of people that have been 
pulled out of poverty in China. When Oxfam was thinking about becoming 
more of a rights-based organization, we were observing what happened 
during the Cold War if you think about it from a rights perspective. We took 
the human rights charter9 from the 1940s and saw that the United States chose 
to focus on the civil and political rights agenda and define that as what human 
rights were all about. But there is another part of the charter that focuses on 
social and economic rights, with the idea that there is a spectrum of rights that 
runs from civil and political through social and economic. 
Much of the Cold War was about the fact that the West championed and 
privileged civil and political rights, while the Soviet Union and China privileged 
economic and social rights. Now the Cold War is over and we’ve got this 
opportunity to put these things back together again in a meaningful way. 
One thing for us as Americans to remember, paradoxically, is that Eleanor 
Roosevelt was the person who actually insisted on the inclusion of the 
economic and social rights provisions in the human rights charter. It’s one of 
her great legacies, and ironically during the height of the Cold War we forgot 
that little bit of history. But now we have an opportunity to revisit it, and I 
think the challenge that we face in many developing countries, particularly 
in Africa, are the cases where a government is doing well in the social and 
economic rights sphere but is doing less well in the civil and political rights 
sphere. How do we manage ourselves in that space? 
I think it’s a more complex question than making a decision about being 
for or against democracy in these situations. It’s about how rights are being 
realized in complex political environments, and is it a progressive process 
where we will achieve the right kind of balance over time. 
In our case we want to believe these rights are indivisible, so we don’t want to 
be in situations where civil and political rights are being completely abused. 
But we recognize that we might be able to support civil society organizations 
in putting pressure across the whole rights spectrum, and in the optimal case 
securing a democratic outcome.
DA: This is a really long question asking you to discuss William Easterly 
and Jeffrey Sachs,10 but that would be a whole other evening together, so that 
questioner will have to catch you afterward. 
RO: I have an easy answer for that question: They’re both right. In some ways, 
what Oxfam has come to believe is that there is a need for more aid than 
we’re currently giving, which is what a lot of Jeffrey Sachs’ argument is about. 
And there is a need for the building of infrastructure and better programs 
                                                              
9  Universal Declaration of Human Rights
                                                              
10  Sachs is an American economist and author of the book The End of Poverty; Easterly is an economics 
professor and a strong critic of Sachs’ ideas.
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and systems that deliver health and education as public goods for societies. 
But that’s not enough. We also believe in the kind of arguments that Easterly 
is making about the need for innovative programs and creative civil society. 
In some ways, again going back to this, the centerpiece of this for us is this 
triangulation of effective states, active citizens and inclusive markets and how 
these things come together in the middle. That’s my easy out on that one. 
DA: What is Oxfam doing in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq? What is its 
challenge in understanding the cultures and religions? 
RO: We’ve certainly been in those contexts as a humanitarian organization. 
I don’t know if many of you are aware, but Iraq was very tough for the 
humanitarian community because almost all of the big humanitarian 
organizations had at least one staff member killed in Iraq. In our particular 
case, our program director there was met with gunmen at the office door, shot 
three times and flown to Amman to be hospitalized and was within inches of 
his life. We ultimately had to close down there, as did Save the Children. You 
may remember the dramatic kidnapping of the CARE director. Médecins Sans 
Frontières lost staff. 
Through the course of the Iraq conflict, in the worst period, literally every 
major U.S. and international humanitarian agency had pulled out of Iraq, and 
humanitarian relief was largely being provided by contractors with heavy 
security provided by private security contractors, which made the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance extraordinarily expensive. So the Iraq case has been 
really quite a difficult case for our community.
One of the issues there, maybe specific to your peace, justice and conflict 
concerns, was precisely the issue of how do international humanitarian 
organizations, which operate in these contexts as impartial actors driven by 
the humanitarian imperative to serve endangered populations, retain our 
impartiality and neutrality in those contexts? Particularly when the mandate 
from the U.S. government at the time that we were operating was that we 
were force multipliers and that we were only allowed in the country in service 
to the U.S. mission of occupation. Those were the rules of engagement that 
we were given – and that means that if you are on the other side in the Iraqi 
conflict, we don’t look impartial. And that was one of the reasons it was such 
a dangerous situation for our community. 
In Afghanistan we were actually operating during most of the Afghan war 
in the early 2000s, and we continue to be there, operating in a number of 
different provinces throughout the country doing longer term development 
work. Again there is this question of the space between the military and the 
humanitarian operators – how we maneuver in that space. 
You may have heard the term PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams], which 
are these military response teams that basically go out to the communities, and 
oftentimes they are military officers but they may not be in uniform. But they 
are carrying weapons, and sometimes they want to be accompanying NGO 
humanitarian workers to these sites. Again, it puts us in this compromised 
position. So there’s this very animated debate that goes on in Washington 
about humanitarian space and how we can be present and operate.
Speaking to cultural and religious practices, in South Asia we’ve supported a 
lot of organizations, some of them from Bangladesh through very big NGO 
deliverers of services, to actually come into Pakistan because they’re Islamic 
and South Asian and they know how to move in that context. They can go to 
geographies that might be delicate for us to move around in. And with these 
groups we’ve been able to do a lot of the work on the ground rather than 
actually being operational ourselves, because our sense was they had a better 
grip on the cultural context than the kind of staff we would send in from the 
West would necessarily have. 
DA: We’ll close with this one. What is the single concrete way that American 
citizens can help effect change, in policy particularly? What can we do?
RO: That was a great setup. Are you ready? Here’s the action plan. I mentioned 
that there’s a lot of momentum in Washington for reform, and I can be a little 
bit more concrete. Howard Berman succeeded Tom Lantos as chairman of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. When Berman took that position, a few 
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others and I met with him and challenged him to embrace this idea. 
This was during the primaries, prior to the major national election, and our 
argument was that this was a historic opportunity, that there was a real debate 
going on in Washington about smart power and the use of diplomacy and 
development to complement the more military approach that we’d taken in 
our foreign policy over the last 10 years. And he decided that he was going 
to make this one of his four or five priorities while chairman of the foreign 
affairs committee. 
He has really embraced this and has already put a bill on the floor of the House 
of Representatives to initiate this reform process. And he put it forward, in some 
sense, to signal the Obama administration – and the State Department – that 
he was dead serious and wanted to take action on this. He wanted that bill to 
embody many of the concerns and principles that I spoke to in my remarks.
That triggered action in the Senate, initiated by Richard Lugar on the 
Republican side. I want to emphasize that this is not a partisan issue – it is a 
bipartisan concern, one of the few in Washington these days, where there’s 
some shared interest on both sides of the aisle. Richard Lugar pressured John 
Kerry, who’s the chairman of the foreign relations committee in the Senate, 
to introduce a bill on that side. So now we have a bill in the House and a bill 
in the Senate. 
That then precipitated action in the State Department and the White House. The 
State Department has initiated something called the Quadrennial Diplomacy 
and Development Review, which is the first time the State Department has 
attempted to undertake a major strategic review of all of its policy and set 
a five-year frame for its work. This is done routinely in the Department of 
Defense under something called the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the 
State Department has now tried to embrace that concept. 
That process is going on right now. That report is issuing interim 
recommendations in the next month or so, and that precipitated the White 
House to do something called a Presidential Study Directive, which is a 
document recommending to the president what actions should be taken to 
initiate this reform process. So that’s what I mean when I say pigs are flying in 
Washington these days – because all of this going on, and all of it being aligned 
in terms of the core principles I talked about is really quite substantial. 
So the process that we expect to see happen is the State Department will offer 
its interim recommendations. They will be incorporated into the Presidential 
Study Directive, which goes to the president’s desk. Then we need a statement 
from the president that he wants to do, in effect, what President Kennedy did 
in 1961, which is make a major speech on development and development 
reform. And in the House and the Senate, their staff is waiting for the output 
from the White House and the State Department so that their bills that go 
forward incorporate all this new reform thinking. 
Our hope is that we can actually get this done. We’re now going to go into an 
election cycle, so things are going to slow down a bit. But the hope is that we 
will get the bills issued on the floor before we go into the election cycle, so 
that they’ll be under review and up for a vote sometime later this year. 
That’s maybe more than you wanted to know, but I would suggest that you 
reach out to your congressperson. As I said, it’s a bipartisan issue, so you can 
remind them of that and reach out on both sides of the aisle. In the Senate, 
Lugar, Corker, Menendez and Kerry are sponsoring the bill.11 And I think there 
are about 20 signatories to the House bill, so there’s a lot of initial support 
for this. So if you want to be helpful, call your congressperson and indicate 
that you’re interested in this reform process in Washington and you want to 
support these bills. 
                                                              
11  Richard Lugar (R-IN), Bob Corker (R-TN), Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and John Kerry (D-MA) introduced 
the Foreign Assistance Revitalization and Accountability Act of 2009, S.1524, in July 2009. The Initiating 
Foreign Assistance Reform Act (H.R. 2139) was introduced in April 2009.
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